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NONOPTIMALITY OF A SIMPLE AND COMMON





One method used by cooperatives for determining patronage refunds
to members is based on (1).
(1) r. » p. - v^ - f X 0
J J j V ^
where
= patronage refund paid to numbers per unit of j-th product.
p. = price charged for j-th product,
^ f
V. « average variable cost for product j, *
J V
f^ = average fixed cost allocated to product j.
The purpose of this note is to show that this simple and intuitively
reasonable method is inconsistent with the attainment of various rea
sonable cooperative objectives. Two different cooperative objectives
are considered: (a) maximization of total patronage refunds, and (b)
maximization of a utility function containing total refunds and quan
tities of various "prestige" products sold. The inconsistency of (1)
with objective (a) is proved in two independent ways: (A) by using
theory of the multi-product firm, and (B) by considering the effect of
adding constraints to a maximization problem. The inconsistency of
(1) with objective (b) is proved by method (B).
The analysis is static and the cooperative's only business is




DEFINITION OF PATRONAGE REFUND
It may help to avoid some confusion later by noting now that
equation (1) is not a definition of patronage refund per unit of pro
duct j. Equation (1) is a method of determining patronage refunds;
other methods also exist. Two other methods of determining patronage
refunds will be presented. These are not to be interpreted as
recommended methods. They are presented simply to emphasize the point
that (1) is a n^thod and cannot be a definition because other methods
are available that satisfy the same definition of "patronage refund per
unit of project j" that (1) satisfies. It can also be shown that each
of these methods is inconsistent with the attainment of reasonable
objectives.
The first method determines patronage refunds for all products as
equal proportions of product prices. Let by quantity sold of
product i^ and let V and F be total variable cost and total fixed cost
and let tt be total patronage refund. Compute tt = Ep.q. - V - F,
ill
Define d ® "H'/Hp.q. and determine the patronage refund per unit of pro-i i i
duct j as r. = pp.. Then Sr q. » pSp.q. « tt.
j J 3- 2. ]. L
The second method results in the same patronage refund per unit
of product for all products. Compute p. from p. = Ti/rq. and set r. =
1 j J J
p, for all j. Then £r.q. = p,2q. = Tr.
1 J J 1 J
EFFECT OF ADDING CONSTRAINTS TO
A MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section it is shown that the addition of a constraint to
a maximization problem cannot increase the maximum attainable value
of the objective function, and can decrease its maximum value.
This seems intuitively reasonable. But I present a proof because
many things that I have thought to be intuitively obvious have turned
out to be demonstrably logically false.
Suppose it is desired to maximize f(X) = f(x^, x^, x^) sub
ject to m independent constraints c^ - ~ ® ^ 1? 2, m.
Each c. is a scalar constant. Each b.(X) = b.(x., x^, x ) is a
1 1 1 i Z' ' n
function of the x^. The "opportunity set" or "feasible set" is the
set of points X satisfying all the constraints; denote this set by
Ki.
Ki = [x I - b^(X) =0 for i - 1, 2, m]
Assume X* is feasible (i.e., X^eK^) and is a global maximum. Then
(2) f(X*) ^ f(X**) for all X**eK^, X** ^ X*
Now suppose another constraint is added to the problem:
^nri-1 " opportunity set or feasible set for this new
problem is K2-
K2 = ^XIc^ - b^(X) - 0 for i « 1, 2, m+1^
This set can also be written
- f XI - b, (X) =0 for i = 1, 2, mand
"=0} ' .
Consider also the set
= |x I - b^(X) 0 for i « 1, 2, mand
7^ 0^
It can be seen that Is the union of K2 and K^; Every point in
or is in K^.
(3) U K3
Suppose f(Z) is the maximum value of the objective function for this
second problem, then
Ze K^, f(Z) 2 f(Z*) for all Z^ Z*
Is it possible for f(Z) to be greater than or equal to f(X'*f)? The
answer is clearly "no." By (3), K2 is a subset of Kj^. Therefore ZeK^,
Because (2) holds for all X**sKj^, it also holds for the particular X**
obtained by setting X** = Z, Therefore f(X*) s f(Z).
Suppose that we have, instead of (2),
(2a) f(X*) = f(Y) > f(X') for all X'eK^^, X* Y7^ X*, YeK^
%
Two different feasible points maximize f(X): the points and Y,
Now, Y is not in the feasible set for the second problem. And K2 is
a subset of K^. Therefore,
f(X*) > f(X') for all X'eK^, X* 7^ X'
and adding the constraint has reduced the maximum attainable value of
the objective function.
Adding a constraint cannot increase the maximum value of the ob
jective function. The only effect of adding a restriction is to
reduce the size of the feasible set, i.e., to eliminate some points
from the feasible set. In this latter case^ adding the nri-l-st con
straint eliminated all of the points in from the feasible set.
This purely mathematical result has an iu^ortant implication for
cooperatives. It says something about ways in which patronage refunds
on individual products should not be determined if the cooperative is
interested in the total patronage refunds paid to members.
MAXIMIZATION OF PATRONAGE REFUNDS
First Proof of Nonoptimality of (1)
Consider a cooperative whose sole business is selling supplies
to members: it buys nothing from members. Let p^ and be price
charged for and quantity sold of product i; let the cooperative's
I
total variable cost function be V(q^, q^, coopera
tive's total fixed cost be F, Total patronage refunds, then, are
n
(4) rr = ^2' ^
From the argument of the preceding section, it immediately follows
that using (1) to determine refunds limits the attainable value of tt.
Maximizing tt while using (1) is equivalent to solving the problem:
Maximize tt subject to - v - S 0 for i = 1, 2, m
and subject to Sf.q. ® F
i ^ ^
The use of (1) amounts to adding a number of restrictions to the problem,
and therefore can be expected to reduce the maximum attainable value
of n.
This mathematical argument , though valid, provides no economic
insight. The followii^ argument provides some economic insight into
the problem.
Second Proof of Nonoptiraality of (1)
The first-order conditions for maximizing (4) with respect to
prices are the n relations
n n
(5) 3tt/Bp = 0 = q + S p. dq./dp - E (BV/5q.) (Sq./Sp,)
J J j 1 1 J
j = 1, If », n
The margin of price over marginal cost for the j-th product is obtained
by solving (5) for p^ - SV/Sq^. It Is
(6) p. - 5V/3q. = -[q + S (p - 9V/5q ) (5q /Sp )l/(Sq /dp )
J J J ^ i i J J J
This is exactly the same relation that Holdren obtained for margin in
his study of multiproduct firms. Relation (6) establishes that , ,
if the dominant relationship is one of complementarity ( S (p. -
dV/Sq^) Sq^/Spj < 0) the profit margin on the j-th commodity may be
zero, greater than zero or less than zero."^ If many of the products
that the cooperative sells are highly complementary with product j,
(3q^/Sp^ < 0)^then (6) may well be negative.
^Holdren, Bob R. The Structure of a Retail Market and the Market
Behavior of Retail Units. Ames, Iowa. Iowa State University Press,
1958, pp. 128-129.
To see the implications of (6) for using (1) to determine refunds,
consider first a simple case in which V = 2 v.q. and all v. are con-i^l t 1
stantj i.e., Sv^/dq^ =0 for all 1 and j. Then 5V/3q^ « and (6) becomes
(7) Pj •
Assume other products are highly complementary with product j. Then
(8) p. - V. < 0
J J
and r. = p • v - f < 0 (assuming f. ^ 0), violates (1). If the ^
j J J <3 J
cooperative requires p. - v . - f. s 0 when (8) holds, it is clear that
*
(7) is not being satisfied. And if (7) is not satisfied, the coopera
tive is not maximizing total patronage refunds because the first-order
conditions (6) are not being satisfied.
If V = T. v.q, and SV/dq, « v. + /dq., (6) can be written
i=l i i J j h " " J
(9) P. - V = -Pq + S (p - SV/Sq ) Oq /ap )]/(dq /3p )
J J J ^ i 3- J J J
Now if q^ is complementary with many other products in production
(3v^/Sq^ < 0) and if demands are highly complementary, again p^ - v^
may well be negative.
Even if p. - v. > 0, using (1) imposes a restriction: namely
J «J
that p. - V . s f..
J J J
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION .
Maximization of patronage refunds is not the only plausible
objective for a cooperative. A cooperative may also desire large
volumes of sales of certain products. This may occur because the
cooperative acquires prestige from sales of these products, because
these products are expected to be highly profitable in the future
even though they may not be profitable now, or for some other reason.
Suppose the cooperative's objective is not to maximize (4), but to
maximize (4a)
(4a) U —UCttj ^2* •••?
It is still true that use of (1) for determining the patronage refunds
is inconsistent with the cooperative's objectives because using (1)
imposes restrictions. Maximizing (4a) and using (1) is equivalent to
solving:
(10) Maximize ^2'
subject ~ Pj_ " ^ ®
AN IMPLICATION OF THEORY OF THE
MULTI-PRODUCT FIRM
Expressions (6) through (9) have some important implications for
multi-product cooperatives; implications that run counter to what
some people conceive to be sound cooperative operating procedure.
Recently the University of Georgia Cooperative Extension Service carried
out a study whose objective was , .to develop a guide for formu
lating and evaluating company policies at the board of director level
2
in agricultural cooperatives." (p. 3) In carrying out the study, they
used a 12-page questionnaire in a survey of cooperative managers,
boards of directors and members. I quote the complete discussion
3
of the topic of Financial Support of New Services.
2
Policy Formulation for Agricultural Cooperatives at the Board of
Director Level, Athens, Georgia, 1973.
3
Op. cit., p. 58. The reference to Gardner refers to Gardner, Kelsey B,
News for Farmer Cooperatives, "Are New Operating Concepts Compatible
Bedfellows with Basic Co-op Principles?" FCS, USDA, Nov. 1971.
Financial Support of New Services
Managetoent cannot predict with certainty which new ser
vices will actually be self-supporting^ but it is obliged to
try, since it is obviously unfair to members who do not want
or need a new service to find themselves subsidizing it from
their other cooperative enterprises. The question formulated
for the Survey was as follows:
In order to avoid the inequity of one service of a
cooperative subsidizing some other service, diligent
effort should be made to insure that any new service
offered will be able to carry its own costs.
There was 91 percent approval of this policy.
When a cooperative finds itself with a new enterprise
that cannot carry its own costs^ naturally the deficit must
be made up from the more profitable enterprises. The
question of how long a Losing enterprise should be sub
sidized needs a policy statement. This one was formulated
for the Survey:
In the event that one department or division operates
at a loss, the deficit may be borrowed from the savings
of other departments, but it should be repaid to the
lending department(s) at the earliest date.
There was 79 percent approval and only 9 percent disapproval
of this policy.
Certainly no activity of the cooperative should be subsi
dized indefinitely from other enterprises or lines of supply,
Gardner refers to this practice as "netting" and has this to
say about it:
I believe that "netting" of losses is not wholly consistent
with the operation-at-cost principle, as applied to the
individual member's transactions. However, I believe also
that the door should not be completely closed to an
association that desires to use "netting" procedure where
circumstances warrant, for example, absorbing some of the
usually inevitable developmental deficits of a new ser
vice before it has achieved its full operating potential."
Consider the statement, "Certainly no activity of the cooperative
should be subsidized indefinitely from other enterprises or lines of
supply" In conjunction with expressions (7) and (8). If the dominant
relationship is one of complementarity with project j, then pj "* ^
Does the quotation mean that product j (assume it to be an established
product) should be dropped? If it means this, then it means that the
cooperative is being advised to cut down on its total patronage
refunds. How come it means this? Pj " ^j ^ ^
cooperative is being advised: "Set at zero," Setting - 0 is,
in effect, maximizing (4) subject to the restriction x^ = 0. And^ as
we saw earlier, adding restrictions cannot increase the maximum value
of the objective function; and can be expected to reduce its value.
In discussing a product for which the right-hand side of (6) --
or (7) or (9) — is negative, we are discussing a "loss-leader" in
the terminology of retailing. Many other products are highly comple
mentary with this product. Because of the many highly negative values
of Sq./Spj, a low price on this product substantially increases sales
volume of a number of other products. And the addition to profits
resulting from the added sales of these other products more than
compensates for any loss on the loss-leader. Considered in isolation
from all other products, a loss-leader may be a money-loser. But
when its complementary relationship to other products is taken into
account, it is a money-maker.
If we, as a profession, are telling cooperatives to drop their
I*.
10
loss-leaders, are we telling them, "Let your proprietary competitors
have all the loss-leaders. Let them have all these products that
successfully attract additional business,"
WHAT NEXT?
Assuming that one accepts the argument of this paper that using
(1) to determine refunds on individual products limits the total
amount of refunds a cooperative can earn (and pay), the question must
arise: "What to do next?"
Writers on science (and on scientists) have noted that "no theory
cannot drive out bad theory," That is, one cannot induce scientists
to stop using a theory simply by convincing them that it is a bad
theory. To induce scientists to stop using a bad theory, it is neces
sary to convince them that it is a bad theory and also to present them
a superior alternative, I daresay that something similar is true
of businessmen: "No decision rule cannot drive out a bad decision
rule." To get businessmen to stop using a bad decision rule, it is
necessary to convince them that it is a bad rule and also to present
them a superior alternative.
The answer to the question "What next?" seems to involve two
things. (A) Determine the proper place for loss-leaders in coopera
tive enterprises. (B) Develop an alternative to (1) that is superior
to (1), relatively easy to use, and consistent with the decision made
on loss-leaders in (A) and with cooperatives' objectives.
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